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Abstract
In this paper we assess polls and prediction markets over a large num-
ber of US elections in order to determine which perform better in terms
of forecasting outcomes. We consider accuracy, bias and decidedness over
different time horizons before an election, and we conclude that prediction
markets appear to outperform polls in terms of accuracy, unbiasedness
and decidedness. We thus contribute to the growing literature comparing
election forecasts of polls and prediction markets.
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1 Introduction
There exist many sources of information one could use to forecast the outcome
of an election ex ante; statistical models, expert opinion, opinion polls, and
prediction markets are just four. Any such forecast is dependent on some
set of information amassed at a particular point in time prior to the event
happening, denoted It, and also on the model through which that information
is processed, ft(It). In this paper we consider two of these potential models:
polls, where information from potential voters is processed by polling companies
and released, and prediction markets, where agents may also use potentially
private information to buy and sell contracts contingent on a particular future
event, thus revealing information in the process of doing so. As such, we are
providing an additional perspective on the so-called Hayek hypothesis (Hayek,
1945; Smith, 1982) which suggests that markets can work efficiently even when
participants have a limited knowledge of the environment or other participants
(see also Hurley and McDonough, 1995).
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In doing so, we build upon prior literature which identifies different types
of prediction market, classified according to type of contract (Snowberg and
Zitzewitz, 2005), and which have sought to examine the historical accuracy of
election markets (Rhode and Strumpf, 2004) and to compare and/or relate the
behavior and performance of these markets to that of opinion polls (e.g. Kou and
Sobel, 2004; Leigh and Wolfers, 2006; Berg, Nelson and Rietz, 2008; Rothschild,
2009).
We make use of a vast, novel dataset to conduct a forecast comparison ex-
ercise between polls and a number of prediction markets. We assess the two
groups based on the same criteria: Accuracy, bias, and precision of forecasts
based on past performance. By accuracy we mean how often a forecast cor-
rectly predicts the election outcome, by bias whether the expected vote share
or outcome probability is equal to the actual vote share or true probability, and
by precision the variance of forecast errors. We find that prediction markets are
more accurate although not necessarily less biased nor more precise.
In Section 2 we introduce our object of interest, the outcome of an election
before we introduce in Section 3 our candidate forecast models and the datasets
we have for each forecast model. Section 4 then discusses the methodology
we use in assessing these forecast models and Section 5 outlines our results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Actual Outcome
The outcomes of an election are manifold; more often than not in US elections,
there are two candidates (a Republican and a Democrat), and the vote share
each receives is one outcome of interest, as well as who actually wins each
election.1
We think of the two-party vote share for candidate or party i in election j
as Vi,j,T , where T is the date of the election, and we denote forecasts of that
vote share made by forecaster f at date t, where t < T , as V̂i,j,f,T |t . If we
are considering only the two-party vote share, then the alternative outcome of
interest is whether or not Vi,j,T > 0.5, as in this situation party i has won the
election in terms of vote share, and hence we might think of a binary variable:
Wi,j,T = 1{Vi,j,T=maxk{Vk,j,T }Nk=1}. (1)
That is, Wi,j,T is 1 if party i wins election j (in terms of vote share), zero
otherwise. We define Wi,j,T in (1) generally for an N -candidate election, yet
often elections in the US involve just two candidates, and in that situation the
probability that Vi,j,T > 0.5, i.e. the vote share on election day is sufficient to
win the election popular vote, is what matters. The forecast made at time t < T
of whether or not a vote share Vi,j,T will be sufficient to win an election we denote
as Ŵi,j,f,T |t = P̂t
(
Vi,j,T = maxk {Vk,j,T }Nk=1
)
, or Ŵi,j,f,T |t = P̂t (Vi,j,T > 0.5)
in the case of a two-candidate election.
1This is particularly so for US Presidential Elections which are determined by the electoral
college system and hence anomalies like the 2000 Bush vs. Gore election can happen where
the winner was Bush even though Gore gained the larger (popular) vote share.
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3 The Candidate Forecast Models
We consider four sources of pre-election forecasts in this paper:
1. Opinion polls as collated by Real Clear Politics, a website that collects
historical and current polling information surrounding elections.2
2. Price data from Iowa Electronic Markets, an online prediction market for
various political (and other) events.3
3. Price data from Betfair, an online betting company that offers markets
which include political events or else which include election outcomes.4
4. Price data from Intrade, an online betting company that offers predomi-
nantly political markets or perhaps politically related markets.5
We consider each to be a forecast model; a mechanism that transforms infor-
mation available at time t, It into a forecast for either a vote share V̂i,j,f,T |t or
a probability of the election outcome Ŵi,j,f,T |t . In the next four subsections
we describe each of these sources of data and comment on the mechanisms that
generate forecasts from information available at time t.
3.1 Opinion Polls
Opinion polls are conducted by numerous companies in the US surrounding all
sorts of elections and political questions (e.g. presidential approval). In the
case of elections, polls are forecasts of vote shares conducted at some point t < T
by polling company f , hence they are denoted as V̂i,j,f,T |t . Notionally, polls
reflect public opinion regarding voting for particular candidates, and assuming
the sample upon which they are based is representative, they can be seen as
some reflection of voting intentions at time t, something which we denote Vi,j,t.
As such, to treat a poll as a forecast of the eventual election outcome, we assume
thus that such voting intentions do not change in the intervening time period.
Hence there are at least two sources of error: the first is that the vote share
forecast by the poll (V̂i,j,f,T |t ) may not be a true reflection of Vi,j,t; and/or Vi,j,t
may differ substantially from Vi,j,T due, for example, to the learning process
that takes place during an election campaign on the part of voters.
Furthermore, political candidates are very keen observers of polls and thus to
some extent there may be endogeneity; candidates may respond to poll outcomes
when t < T , increasing or decreasing effort levels. For example, a particularly
disappointing set of polls may lead to a candidate increasing his or her effort
in an election, which may thus impact Vi,j,T causing it to differ from Vi,j,t.
Furthermore, the success of campaign fundraising efforts may also be affected
by poll outcomes (and potentially prediction markets also). As some polling
companies are known or suspected to favor one political party or the other, it
may also be that there is some strategic behavior on the part of pollsters in the
timing and nature of their polls.
2See http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ for details.
3See http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/.
4See http://www.betfair.com.
5See http://www.intrade.com/.
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Figure 1: Plot of poll forecasts for Obama vote share in 2008 Presidential Elec-
tion by day.
Nonetheless, considering the data at our disposal, we take polls to be fore-
casts of voting intentions on election day, T , as expressed at time t, and we
analyse the extent to which they are effective forecasts of Vi,j,T . We take our
data from Real Clear Politics (RCP) which compiles polling data from thou-
sands of US elections over recent years. Table 5 summarizes the elections from
which we have collected data from RCP; overall we have 19,277 observations
from 394 different elections ranging from presidential elections in 2004 and 2008
both at the national and state levels, senate, governor and house elections and
also Republican presidential candidate selection processes in 2008 and 2012, and
the Democratic selection process from 2008.
We collect information on the polling company, the length of time the poll
was conducted over, size and type of audience polled (likely voters or registered
voters), forecast vote share for each candidate, and we also record the final
outcome of each election.6 There are averages of polls that are constructed by
various groups, such as RCP themselves, and also others such as Nate Silver at
the blog FiveThirtyEight . Although averaging can be a useful tool, particularly
if the weights are appropriate (see, e.g., Bates and Granger, 1969; Graefe et al.,
2012), it can only outperform the best individual forecast within the pool of
forecasts being averaged in the presence of systematic bias (for example if one
forecast is known to be positively biased and another negatively biased). Hence
given this and our particular loss function in this paper, we focus on individual
polls and forecast methods, seeking to understand better any bias that may
exist.
Figure 1 plots poll outcomes for Obama’s vote share during 2008 for the
2008 Presidential election; his final 52.9% vote share is denoted by the solid
black line. The plot should be viewed from right to left, as the horizontal axis
is the number of days remaining until the election takes place. Different polling
companies are represented by different colors and symbols. Gallup is one of
the most frequent pollsters and its polls (blue empty squares) appear to become
more accurate as election day nears. All polls throughout the campaign appear
from Figure 1 to underpredict Obama’s eventual vote share, and even in the
6We have data on 446 individual poll producers, however many of the producers of polls
are collaborations, such as Reuters and Zogby or Reuters and Ipsos. It is hard to get a
precise number of the different forecasting companies involved because RCP often lists them
abbreviated, but it appears there are around 200 distinct companies or organizations reflected
in our dataset.
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final few days the majority of polls announced suggest a vote share lower than
what eventually results.
Gelman and King (1993) investigate the observed variability in polls despite
the fact that election outcomes are particularly predictable at the outset of
campaigns. They find that voters learn over the campaign which contributes
to some extent to the variability of polls, meaning that early polls are less
reliable relative to those conducted nearer to election date. Additionally their
research suggests that poll forecasts should be dominated at all stages by expert
opinion, statistical and other types of forecast models that embody some subset
of that information. Gelman and King focus on Presidential elections, and the
1988 election in particular, although it is undoubtedly the case that many of
their conclusions generalize. Nonetheless they do note that some of the effects
they emphasize will likely be different for primary elections, and presumably for
Senate, Governor and House races.
3.2 Prediction Markets
Prediction markets are markets in which participants buy and sell contracts in
event (including election) outcomes. For example, if the market was the 2008
Presidential Election, the contracts would be for the Democratic candidate to
win, or the Republican candidate to win. Prediction markets have attracted
a great deal of attention in recent years from academic economists because, as
Berg, Nelson and Rietz (2008) note, their primary role is as a forecasting tool
rather than a resource allocation mechanism (although to some extent it can
be said that they are part of the portfolio allocation problem of participants
since there exists some a priori expected rate of return). Nonetheless, provided
their design mechanism is effective, the prices produced will reflect expected
probabilities of outcomes. Furthermore, in general the markets are short-term
(the majority of those we consider in this paper last for considerably less than a
year), and once the outcome is realized, the true value of the contract is known.
This property enables researchers to consider whether or not prediction markets
forecast events well.
Berg, Nelson and Rietz (2008) note the important differences between polls
and prediction markets as forecasting devices. The former, at least in principle,
are representative samples of the population (or deliberately selected sections
of the population), whereas prediction markets are self-selected in that market
participants must actively choose to take part. As a result, prediction market
participants are anything but representative of the general population; as Berg
et al point out, “traders are typically young, white, well educated and have
high family incomes”. Nonetheless, it is clear that this ought to be irrelevant
for the accuracy of prediction market forecasts since the payoff structure means
that market participants must put aside their own particular preferences over
candidates and predict the voting behavior of the electorate at large if they are
to make non-negative returns.
Prediction Markets (PMs) have been up and running for over 20 years at
this point; with the first market having been established for the 1988 Bush-
Dukakis contest (Rothschild, 2009). Berg et al. (2008), in their meta-analysis
of the performance of PMs in elections in the USA and in other established
democracies, found that, in terms of predicting the final result, “in the majority
of (...) cases the market does about as well as the average poll, sometimes worse
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but often better, even if by a small margin” (p. 747); a finding that builds on a
previous papers comparing PMs data to poll data. Erikson and Wlezien (2008)
note that electoral markets have gained intellectual traction both in academic
circles and in the popular press, with Surowiecki’s (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds
popularizing the idea that aggregated predictions of voting outcomes, which
ask individuals to evaluate likely electoral outcomes can be ‘better’ (p. 35)
than polls, which ask voters how they themselves will vote. Indeed, futures
markets have been extended to predict non-electoral political phenomena, most
controversially the likelihood of terrorist attacks (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).
Dissenting voices have questioned the alleged superiority of election markets
to polls, and some of the most recent published research comparing polls to elec-
toral markets has sought to ‘discount’ (Rothschild, 2009) or ‘de-bias’ (Erikson
and Wlezien, 2008) poll data, in order to account for observed early poll mar-
gin overestimation and anti-incumbency biases in polling data. However, while
Erikson and Wlezien found that de-biased poll data outperform national-level
electoral market data for US Presidential elections between 1988 and 2004, espe-
cially in winner-takes-all predictions, Rothschild found that de-biased market-
based data outperforms de-biased poll data in state-level forecasts in the 2008
US Presidential and Senatorial elections. Additionally, Lee and Moretti (2009)
use a model of Bayesian learning to suggest that information passes from polls to
PMs, while Sjo¨berg (2009) also challenges the notion of the ‘wisdom of crowds’
by looking at a range of different groups of forecasters for Swedish elections. Fi-
nally, similar comparisons of prediction market forecasts to more traditionally
generated forecasts have been carried out in sports betting, looking at prices
posted by bookmakers against prediction markets (Spann and Skiera, 2009;
Croxson and Reade, 2011; Franck, Verbeek and Nu¨esch, 2011, see, for exam-
ple). As such, the relative performance of poll versus electoral market data is
still open to debate.
In the next three sections we introduce in turn the three prediction mar-
kets (Iowa Electronic Markets, Intrade and Betfair) we will examine for their
performance in predicting election outcomes.
3.2.1 Iowa Electronic Markets
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) are not-for-profit operated prediction markets
generally linked to political elections (but also markets have existed for box
office movies and other one-off events), and have been running since 1988. On
IEM participants are limited in their exposure in any trade to $500. Markets
have been set up for all major elections for over a decade, and in particular we
have collected data on their prediction markets since 2000. Their markets tend
to have two forms, either a winner-takes-all (WTA) or a vote-share (VS) format.
The former corresponds to forecasting the election outcome and hence would
be described as Ŵi,j,f,T |t , while the latter corresponds to providing forecasts of
the form V̂i,j,f,T |t .
We have 45,590 observations covering 38 elections; those elections are Pres-
idential (2000, 2004 and 2008), Congressional (House and Senate and a joint
market, 2000–2010), and a somewhat ad hoc collection of mayoral elections
and primary elections (alongside Democratic and Republican Conventions since
2000). See Table 6 for more details. For each market and contract IEM makes
available on a daily basis the number of trades (units and dollar volume), the
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Figure 2: Vote share (top panel) and winner takes all (bottom panel) markets
for 2008 US Presidential Election on IEM.
highest and lowest prices traded at, and the average price. An important
distinction between IEM markets for House and Senate elections is that the
contracts bought and sold are for macro outcomes: Either the Democrats or the
Republicans have a majority in the House or Senate as a result of the election.
Similarly, the Republican and Democratic Convention markets allow the trad-
ing in contracts about the eventual outcome rather than individual primaries.
As Table 6 shows, there are a couple of exceptions (e.g. New York Senate),
but generally IEM does not provide markets for individual elections outside
Presidential elections.
Figure 2 presents prices from IEM for the 2008 Presidential election; on the
top panel the VS market prices are plotted (high, low and average), while on
the bottom panel the WTA prices are plotted. These two graphs visualize
the difference between the vote share type of forecasts that polls constitute,
V̂i,j,f,T |t , and the probability of outcome, Ŵi,j,f,T |t , that prediction markets
usually provide. Viewing from right-to-left, as the election day draws near,
although the vote shares forecast don’t diverge particularly strongly (top panel),
the probability of each outcome does diverge substantially, and in the final days
of the election the probability of a Democratic victory is around 85% and above.
Berg, Nelson and Rietz (2008) compare IEM to polls for Presidential elec-
tions back to 1988, and find that IEM outperforms the polls in head-to-head
comparisons. In relation to their study, we consider a much broader selec-
tion of recent elections of all types for both polls and IEM (again see Tables 6
and 5), a strategy that affords us a larger dataset of more recent polls. Berg,
Nelson and Rietz (2008) note how the demographic of market participants on
IEM has changed over the years since 1988, and hence by considering elections
only after 2000 we expect to have data more representative of the current IEM
demographic.
Erikson and Wlezien (2009) on the other hand contends that polls are ac-
tually more informative than prediction markets making use of novel data on
informal prediction markets for presidential elections going back to 1880, and
7
Dem (average) 
Rep (average) 
Dem (high) 
Rep (max) 
Dem (low) 
Rep (min) 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
0.5
1.0
Figure 3: Plot of implied probability of each party winning 2008 Presidential
Election from Betfair.
using multivariate methods. Although we cannot match Erikson and Wlezien
(2009) for sample length, we have substantially broader depth in that we con-
sider here various types of election other than Presidential elections giving us
the sample size we mentioned above. Additionally, we have multiple observa-
tions per election whereas Erikson and Wlezien (2009) only use one observation,
taken immediately prior to each election. Given King and Gelson’s findings re-
garding the accuracy of polls as election date nears, it seems likely that this
is a favorable comparison for polls; we will be able to shed light on this using
our dataset. Erikson and Wlezien (2008) do consider polls with longer time
horizons until the election when considering Presidential elections between 1988
and 2004, and conduct an empirical bias correction for these polls.
3.2.2 Betfair
Betfair is an online betting company providing markets primarily in sports
events but also increasingly in political events such as elections. In the jargon,
participants either back or lay bets on events, equivalent to buying or selling
contracts paying out contingent on that event happening, such as a politician
to win an election. Betfair operates a limit order book, as it matches partici-
pants willing to buy and sell contracts at particular prices. In contrast to IEM,
participants are not restricted in their potential exposure on Betfair to any ar-
bitrarily imposed limit, and Betfair is a for-profit company; it seems likely that
this would influence the self-selection that takes place for potential market par-
ticipants. When applied to our context of election outcomes with two parties,
Betfair yields observations corresponding to Ŵi,j,f,T |t .
As our objective is to consider what publicly available information could be
used to best forecast an election, although our data is very rich, only certain
aspects of it are relevant. Market participants using Betfair can see what
prices are available to buy and sell contracts in an event, and how much money
(liquidity) is available at each price (buy or sell).
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the implied probabilities (reciprocal of the
market prices for contracts) for each party to win the 2008 Presidential election
over the 900 days prior to the election. In Figure 3 the maximum and minimum
prices for a given day, as well as the average price, are plotted, but as these are
very similar to each other it is almost impossible to distinguish them in the plot.
This plot can be compared to the bottom plot in Figure 2 which shows the same
8
price evolution for IEM. As with IEM, the Democrats are always the favorites
throughout the 900 days shown, and by a slightly larger margin consistently
than IEM, with a similar pattern of divergence in probabilities in the final 50
days of the campaign. These plots suggest that, as with polls highlighted by
Gelman and King, also with prediction markets learning takes place and the
nearer an election is, the more decided becomes the market on the most likely
outcome.
3.2.3 InTrade
Intrade is a prediction market specializing in US political elections.7 There are
no limits on the amount that individuals can trade, as opposed to IEM, and the
format is essentially identical: market participants trade contracts whose payout
is contingent on some event occurring.8 As such, when thinking specifically
about election outcomes with two parties, our Intrade data provides us with
observations corresponding to Ŵi,j,f,T |t .
We have data from the 2004 and 2008 US Presidential Election; for both
years we have all individual state voting and for 2008 we have a range of addi-
tional politically related markets.
For the 2004 elections, we have daily data consisting of the high, low and
closing prices, while in 2008 we have data on individual trades carried out on
the exchange. The 2008 data provides information on whether contracts were
bought or sold, the price at which the trade took place and the quantity, along-
side a timestamp of when the trade took place. We have 29,196 observations
from the 2004 Presidential election (although all of these relate to individual
state markets rather than the overall outcome), and 411,858 from the 2008 elec-
tions (although not all of these relate specifically to elections — see Table 8 for
a breakdown).
The purpose of this study is to find the best forecast method, and since
Intrade reports on its website very visibly the price of the last agreed trade,
clearly more information exists for 2008 for us to assess the Intrade predictions,
but nonetheless the information from 2004 does provide additional information.
Figure 4 shows the Intrade implied probabilities (prices divided by 100) for
the same 900 days prior to the 2008 Presidential election as in Figures 2 and
3. As is perhaps clear, the two parties appear a little closer as measured by
Intrade; at two years prior to the election, the two are absolutely even, and
even with just 50 days to go before the election, the two implied probabilities
overlap for a short period. It is quite likely that this overlap with just 50 days
remaining was due to market manipulation; one trader apparently traded so
as to raise the price on Intrade for the Republican candidate, John McCain.9
As discussed by Hanson and Oprea (2009), we do not see this as necessarily
7Indeed, the perception has long been that Intrade provides for US elections while Betfair
does so for UK elections; see, for example, http://www.midasoracle.org/2007/04/24/betfair-
vs-tradesports-intrade/ (last accessed April 17 2012).
8Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare Intrade to News Futures, a prediction market
based on ‘play money’, using a ‘game’ format, to ascertain whether “money matters”. They
find that money doesn’t appear to improve the forecast performance of prediction markets.
Our analysis, comparing Intrade and Betfair to IEM will shed some light on this question
since IEM restricts the amount of money participants are able to bet.
9See http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2008/10/manipulation-of.html
for more information on this.
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Figure 4: Plot of implied probability of each party winning 2008 Presidential
Election from Intrade.
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Figure 5: Plot of comparable prices from all three prediction markets from the
2008 Presidential Election.
a problem for our analysis; a manipulator in a liquid market might be viewed
as offering other traders a kind of free lunch in correcting that manipulator’s
attempts to distort.
As with both previous prediction markets, Intrade has also attracted aca-
demic interest; Gil and Levitt (2007) investigated market efficiency looking at
the 2002 FIFA World Cup, while Hartzmark and Solomon (2008) considered the
disposition effect using NFL markets. Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007)
use TradeSports, swallowed up by Intrade in 2008, to infer implications from
elections onto the macroeconomy by using the 2004 US Presidential election
when unreliable exit polls caused substantial price variation within a single day.
We can now compare all three markets on one plot, in Figure 5, and over
a long period of time the co-movement between these series is very clear. A
comparison between these three prediction markets is of great interest, not least
because the self-selection that takes place in each market will likely be different;
Betfair does not allow those based in the US to trade in their markets, while
IEM does operate in the US but restricts its participants in their exposure,
while Intrade allows those based in the US to trade in its markets but does not
restrict the exposure of participants. Hence it is of interest to compare these
three markets in their ability to forecast elections; do these differences matter?
Furthermore can any of them, as Berg, Nelson and Rietz (2008) assert, improve
upon polls?
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4 Methodology
We seek metrics to assess each candidate forecast model. Such metrics should be
impartial between the different forecast models and hence give us an objective
outcome regarding the best forecast model. An immediate obstacle in this
pursuit is that we have two types of forecasts; both those of vote share, V̂i,j,f,T |t ,
and probabilistic forecasts, Ŵi,j,f,T |t ; with the former the outcome is continuous
over the unit interval, whereas for the latter the outcome is a binary variable.
Page (2008) considers how to compare such different types of information and
concludes that one requires the probability distribution of vote shares, or some
approximation or estimation thereof, to make a comparison. In this paper
we transform polled outcomes to probabilities using non-parametric estimation.
We have hundreds of thousands of polled outcomes and hence we can use these
to form a probability distribution, controlling for systematic factors which affect
poll accuracy.
As with other attempts to compare forecast methods such as Erikson and
Wlezien (2009), if we rely on direct comparison forecast by each forecaster for
particular events, we will be severely restricted in our number of elections and
hence observations relative to the total datasets we have at our disposal. Instead
we assess each forecasting method over all the elections we are able to collect
data on for that method (see Tables 5–8). Thus we attempt to establish for each
forecaster, independent of the others, how well it forecasts election outcomes,
before comparing these performances between forecasters. There is considerable
overlap between our datasets for each forecaster such that we are considering
forecast performance over very similar datasets.10
Any forecast assessment is reliant on the loss function assumed; what loss
do we suffer if the forecast is wrong in a particular direction? With elections
and vote shares, such a loss function is unlikely symmetric since if a forecast is
for 51%, then if the outcome is ±2%, thus 49% or 53%, it matters which way
— up and the election outcome (in terms of vote share) is unaltered, down and
the outcome changes.
Our objective is to pick the winner in a forthcoming election, and hence a
very simple metric for forecasts is accuracy: how often does the forecast outcome
occur? Hence whether the forecast is for a vote share of 51% or 65% is somewhat
irrelevant provided that that event happens. However, it is likely that election
outcomes that are nearer to 50% (for a two-party election) will induce lower
success rates. Bearing this in mind, and given that often US Presidential
elections are very close, we also move to consider forecasts more generally. In
this sense, it must be the case that a good forecast is both unbiased, displaying
no systematic biases, and precise, and we will outline how we test for this in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
One of the most important factors determining the accuracy of forecasts is
the time horizon, denoted h = T − t. As a general rule, forecast accuracy
declines with h (Hendry and Clements, 1998), and Gelman and King note this
in the context of Presidential election polls. Although we have intra-daily data
from Betfair and Intrade, because only a small number of polls are released on
10While two or three of our models will have overlapping observations for many elections, the
elections for which we have comparable data for all four models is restricted to essentially the
2008 Presidential election (for example, for Intrade we have only state-level 2004 Presidential
election data but for Betfair and IEM we have only national level market data).
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Figure 6: Interface of Betfair (left panel) when attempting to bet on 2012 US
Presidential Election outcome, and graph available to Betfair market participant
of recent price movements (right panel).
any given day and because IEM data is only available at the daily frequency,
we instead consider weekly time intervals when assessing our forecast models,
and specifically, weeks until the election takes place. While we could consider
information from each day, this would likely lead to rather erratic results due to
the lower frequency of polls and also trades as the time interval to an election
increases.11 A weekly frequency also allows us to more easily comprehend
general movements and trends between our forecast models over the entire year
before an election takes place. Hence from hereon, when a time dimension is
mentioned, we are referring to weeks before the election.
Our objective of considering what forecast is best from our candidate forecast
models also restricts interest in our datasets to what would be available from
our prediction markets for forecasting the election. On Betfair, the immediate
interface reveals the three most popular prices for buying or selling each contract
(see the left panel of Figure 6), although one can also see a graph of recent price
movements, and an example is shown in the right panel of Figure 6 for the 2012
election race. Detail on previous trades matched are not readily available other
than their implications on the market price and hence for the purposes of this
paper we disregard our data on quantity to focus solely on price.
For IEM, market activity up to the previous day is available on the website
even to those who do not participate in the market, as is a graph of all recent
price movements, and hence the data we have in our dataset is data that could
be used to construct a forecast of the election.
On Intrade, information on the best priced contract and most recently traded
contract, both bought and sold, is made available to all visitors to the website.
Figure 7 shows the initial interface that greets a willing participant on Intrade
if they wish to buy or sell a contract on the 2012 Presidential election outcome;
the best available price to buy and sell each contract is provided, as is a graph
of recent price movements, if desired. If the participant clicks on one of the
candidates, the page on which they buy or sell also reveals the price of the
last contract bought or sold, additional potentially important information to be
11As an example of this, IEM’s 2012 presidential election market has recorded a number
of days recently with no trades taking place when there are 28 weeks remaining until the
election.
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Figure 7: Interface of Intrade when attempting to bet on 2012 US Presidential
Election outcome.
used in forecasting. Hence it is important that we make use of our dataset
that contains information on every trade that has taken place in that market,
although again we can disregard for the purposes of forecasting future elections
the quantity data we have.
4.1 Accuracy and Unbiasedness
A very simple measure of accuracy is the percentage of correct forecasts. This
is the most direct measure of what minimises our loss function probabilistically;
the forecast method that forecasts correctly most often must on average yield
the lowest loss. In the case of markets that provide Ŵi,j,f,T |t forecasts, we
take a forecast to be predicting a particular outcome if that particular forecast
probability is the highest of the candidates in an election. Hence we take,
for i = 1, . . . , N contestants in an election Ŵ ∗i,j,f,T |t = maxk P̂t (Vk,j,T > 0.5),
the candidate or party with the highest forecast probability of winning, as the
forecast outcome at that point. For forecasts of the nature V̂i,j,f,T |t , we take
V̂ ∗i,j,f,T |t = maxk V̂k,j,T |t , the maximum vote share, as the favorite and hence
predicted outcome. We also denote V ∗i,j,T |t = maxk Vk,j,T |t as the candidate
with the highest vote share and hence the winner of the popular vote in an
election.12
We thus calculate, for forecast model f , the percentage of correct forecasts
as:
%f =
∑Ni
i=1
∑Nj
j=1
∑Nt
t=1 1
{
V ∗i,j,T=V̂
∗
i,j,f,T |t
}
NiNjNt
, (2)
where Nj is the number of elections considered, Ni the number of candidates
and Nt the number of time periods. We compare forecasts along this dimension
to assess the accuracy of polls.13
A related but distinctly different concept to accuracy is that of unbiasedness.
An unbiased forecast can be defined separately for each kind of forecast:
• An unbiased vote share forecast is, on average, equal to the true vote share
outcome: E
(
V̂i,j,f,T |t
)
= Vi,j,T .
12Which, as noted earlier, need not correspond to the actual winner of the election.
13Note that we could be more demanding with our measure of accuracy in (2) and require
that forecast models got the final ranking of candidates correct; all we require is that the
forecast model correctly identifies the favorite.
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• An unbiased probability forecast is, on average, equal to the true proba-
bility that that candidate wins the election: E
(
Ŵi,j,f,T |t
)
= Wi,j,T .
Hence forecasts that are accurate can be also biased, provided the bias is in
the correct direction; if polls are consistently upward biased for candidates that
eventually win, then despite being biased they will be very accurate in predicting
the outcome, whereas polls that are consistently downward biased for candidates
that eventually win will be very inaccurate as well as biased.
When we consider vote share forecasts for candidate i in election j, V̂i,j,f,T |t ,
after an election has happened we observe the true Vi,j,T and hence we can
evaluate the forecast error :
êVi,j,f,T |t = Vi,j,T − V̂i,j,f,T |t . (3)
We can use this forecast error to consider the possibility of biased forecasts. In
taking the simple average of (3) we thus learn whether or not a forecast method
is unbiased or not. Hence we calculate:
MFEt =
Nf,t∑
i=0
eˆVi,j,f,T |t , (4)
where Nf,t denotes the number of forecasts we have for each forecast method
at each time period t.
Although we could substitute W for V in (3) and (4) when we observe
forecasts that are probabilities of outcomes, it is likely that because the outcome
is binary that a summation such as in (4) would unfairly penalize probabilistic
forecasts that are above 50% but not by particularly much. As such we seek an
alternative approach, and one method, often referred to as calibration testing, is
to regress the outcome on the probability as produced by the forecast method:14
Wi,j,T = αW + βW Ŵi,j,f,T |t + εWi,j,t. (5)
The assumption we place on εi,j,T determines the kind of regression model
we employ; although it can be shown that estimating (5) via OLS induces
heteroskedasticity, it is most convenient for our analysis to estimate using OLS
since that implies an iid (independent and identical distribution) assumption
for εWi,j,t of ε
W
i,j,t ∼ (0, σ2W ); we will later make use of this.
In (5), if αV = 0 and βV = 1 the forecast method is said to be unbiased since
then E
(
Ŵi,j,f,T |t
)
= Wi,j,T (because E
(
εWi,j,t
)
= 0). Hence the F-test of the
null hypothesis αV = 0 and βV = 1 is our test of unbiasedness. If the constant
term αV 6= 0 then the forecast method does exhibit some systematic bias, while
if βV 6= 1 then if the true probability of an event changes, the forecast method
either over- or under-adjusts. This phenomenon is commonly referred to in the
betting literature as the favorite longshot bias (FLB). The conventional FLB
(βW > 1) is where bettors relatively over-bet event outcomes with lower im-
plied probabilities of winning (inferred from the odds) and relatively (though
not necessarily absolutely) under-bet event outcomes with higher implied prob-
abilities of winning. The reverse FLB (βW < 1) occurs where bettors relatively
14Note we write Wi,j,T here, adding a t to the outcome; the observed outcome does not
change through time, we just add this in order that we can run regressions for different
forecasts at different time ts before the election occurs.
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over-bet and under-bet the converse. Returning to our comparison of bias and
accuracy earlier, it ought to be that FLB aids forecast accuracy; a favorite is
probabilistically more likely to win and hence if in a market the favorite wins
more often than its price (or vote share) implies, that market must predict the
correct outcome more often.
We seek a method to assess forecasts that is unitless due to the two different
types of forecast in our dataset, and hence we employ the same method outlined
in (5) when considering forecasts from polls. Just as αV = 0 and βV = 1 implies
E
(
Ŵi,j,f,T |t
)
= Wi,j,T , and hence that the fitted line through the scatter plot
of forecasts against outcomes corresponds to the 45 degree line, we can apply
the same methodology to polls; does a polled vote share of, say, 47% imply that
on average the resulting outcome is 47%? Hence we run the regression of:
Vi,j,T = αV + βV V̂i,j,f,T |t + εVi,j,t. (6)
Equivalently to above, αV = 0 and βV = 1 imply that on average polled levels
equal actual outcomes and hence the forecast model is unbiased: E
(
V̂i,j,f,T |t
)
=
Vi,j,T . The value of this method in comparing our two types of forecast is
that for probabilistic forecasts (Ŵi,j,f,T |t ) we compare to the expected value of,
E (Wi,j,T ) rather than the binary variable itself, Wi,j,T . This reduces a potential
distortion when comparing forecast errors from vote shares and probablistic
forecasts.
Additionally, if αV = 0 and βV = 1 are imposed then ê
V
i,j,f,T |t = ε̂
V
i,j,f,T |t ,
our regression model (6) becomes equivalent to the forecast error from (3) earlier
for vote shares, and hence we can think about (6) as a generalized forecast error.
By running the regression in (6) we learn about the actual relationship between
E
(
V̂i,j,f,T |t
)
and Vi,j,T rather than asserting that the two are equal. Similarly
as with (5), if βV > 1 we have FLB: the favorite on average gets a higher vote
share than the outsider.
Thus in both regression models, (5) and (6), the null hypothesis of αg = 0
and βg = 1, g ∈ {V, Y }, implies that the forecast method is unbiased — on aver-
age it forecasts without error. Although a visual examination of the estimated
α and β coefficients will be informative, it is also useful to construct a direct
test of unbiasedness, and hence we use an F test of the hypothesis that αg = 0
and βg = 1 to evaluate the unbiasedness of our forecast methods. Because in
both types of forecast the F-test measures departures from unbiasedness (ex-
pected values), it should not be influenced by the distinction between Vi,j,T
being continuous on the unit interval and Wi,j,T being binary.
As a final aside on bias, it is worth noting that Erikson and Wlezien and
other investigators often de-bias forecasts from polls and prediction markets.
We refrain from doing so, preferring instead to compare raw data, noting the
biases present in the raw data as we compare forecast models.
4.2 Precision
Having considered unbiasedness, it is now helpful to move on to thinking about
precision — how precise are the forecasts we get? A conventional measure of the
precision of a forecast is the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) — squaring
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the forecast errors we calculated in (3) and summing:
MSFEg =
Nf,t∑
i=0
(
εˆgT |t
)2
, g ∈ {V, Y } , (7)
This is an approximation to the variance of the forecast, centred around the out-
come, and hence is equivalent to the estimated standard error for our regression
model, (6), denoted σ̂2f since the formula for that is:
σ̂2g =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
(ε̂gi,j,t)
2 =
1
Nf,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
(
Vi,j,T − α̂g − β̂gV̂i,j,f,T |t
)2
=
Ng∑
i=0
(
eˆgT |t
)2
= MSFEg, g ∈ {V, Y } ,
(8)
provided α̂Y = 0 and β̂Y = 1. Thus σ̂
2
g is a more general measure of forecast
accuracy than MSFE which imposes restrictions on (6).
In essence, σ̂2W measures how imprecise a prediction market is at providing
probabilistic forecasts, while σ̂2V measures how imprecise at providing vote-share
forecasts a poll is. However, these two σ̂2 measures consider the precision
around the actual relationship between forecasts and outcomes, rather than
the 45-degree line (which αg = 0 and βg = 1 would imply). The equivalent
MSFE measures impose the αg = 0 and βg = 1 restrictions without testing
their appropriateness but nonetheless do provide important information — how
dispersed around the 45-degree line are the forecasts.
Hence we assess forecast errors and the F test of α = 0 and β = 1 to assess
forecast unbiasedness and analyze MSFEs and σ̂2 assess forecast precision.
5 Results
We now consider the accuracy, bias and precision of each of our forecasting
models. We first consider accuracy via the percentage of correct forecasts (2),
presenting the results graphically for each market then assessing the markets
head-to-head, before considering via regression methods the accuracy and pre-
cision of the markets.
5.1 Accuracy
Figure 8 reports the overall percentage of polls that correctly forecast the ac-
tual outcome by weeks before the election was due to take place, and the bars
represent the number of polls that fall into each category.15 We then refine by
particular types of election.
The overall percentage of forecasts which are correct drawn from polls is
71.0%, increasing to 76.8% if only the Presidential elections of 2004 and 2008
are considered. In Figure 8 we chart the performance of polls as the distance
to election, and hence the forecast horizon, increases. There appears to be
no particular improvement in poll performance as an election nears, something
15Where we point out that the ‘winner’ in terms of vote share is taken to be the candidate
that won the most votes, hence for example in the 2000 Presidential election, Gore is classed
as the winner as he won more of the popular vote.
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Figure 8: Percentage of polls that correctly predict election outcome by weeks
until election.
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Figure 9: Percentage of IEM prices that correctly predict election outcome by
weeks until election.
which contrasts with Gelman and King’s findings. Even for presidential elec-
tions, for which performance does appear to peak in the 4–5 weeks before an
election, performance is actually comparable if not better between weeks 19 and
23 where just under 100 polls record a success percentage of slightly over 90%.
The black diamonds in Figure 8 show the overall performance of polls for all
elections we consider, and this does improve slightly from a low of just above
60% with 13 weeks remaining to around 80% with two weeks remaining, but this
performance is not significantly better than polling performances 30–40 weeks
before an election.16
Turning to IEM, we split forecasts into vote share (VS) and winner-takes-all
(WTA) markets. The percentage of forecasts that were correct is 83.5% (VS)
and 79.8% (WTA), changing to 85.2% and 72.3% respectively for presidential
elections. Figure 9 presents a graphical breakdown of how these percentages
move as the time until election increases with WTA on the left panel, VS on
the right. What is perhaps most notable here is that IEM’s WTA Presidential
elections forecasts seem significantly worse than all of its other election forecasts
in the final 20 weeks before the election takes place — before that, its success
ratio is considerably higher the IEM average. Intriguingly, the VS markets show
Presidential election forecasts better than average, although there is little other
than Presidential markets in this category of market (85% of our observations
are from the 2000, 2004 and 2008 Presidential elections), but in absolute terms
16In Figure 12 we plot standard error bands helping to make such a comparison.
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Figure 10: Percentage of Betfair prices that correctly predict election outcome
by weeks until election.
the percentage is higher, remaining just shy of 85% up to the final week of the
election, as opposed to the WTA percentage of between 55% and 65%.
With Betfair, we display the percentage of correct forecasts in Figure 10
weekly for a year in advance of each election. Betfair’s overall percentage of
correct forecasts is 85.5% and 99.8% for the 2008 Presidential election (falling
to 95.3% for the Next President market), while we present the breakdown by
weeks before an election occurs in Figure 10. Aside from this almost perfect
record in forecasting the 2008 election, additionally for both Republican and
Democratic primaries, Betfair has a success percentage of 87.1% in the final 30
weeks of campaigns. Betfair forecasts of statewide elections for the electoral
collage (upside down triangles) improve from essentially zero 20 weeks before
election day to 90% in the final week.
Figure 11 shows Intrade percentages in the same format as for the previous
three candidate forecast models. Intrade has a percentage of forecasts turning
out correct of 84.0%, rising to 88.1% for the 2008 Presidential election. As
with Betfair, we see a high level of correct forecasts, particularly for the 2008
Presidential election where again up to around week 38, Intrade prices imply a
correct forecast almost every trade. From Table 8 we have a large collection
of markets from Intrade related to US Presidential elections in 2008 other than
simply the outcome or vote share, and the purple dots in Figure 11 represent
these; as can be seen, the prediction record on these more eclectic events (e.g.
whether a particular video will be released by the LA Times by a particular
date) is dramatically worse than for US elections, as even in the week before
the election takes place the percentage of forecasts that are correct is only
around 50%. However as these minor markets make up a small fraction of our
total observations, their impact on the overall percentage is minimal; it is lower
percentages for statewide Presidential elections, Governor markets and other
Presidential-related markets that pulls the overall percentage down.
It is perhaps more informative to compare our four candidate forecasts with
each other directly on a plot, and Figure 12 does that, plotting the four as
different series over the year up to elections. We additionally include 95%
significance-level standard error bounds around each market’s plot, enabling
us to assess whether differences are significant.17 The plot indicates that the
17The distinctly differently sized confidence bands is more a function of sample size rather
than any inherent uncertainty in particular models. This is because we only have one obser-
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Figure 11: Percentage of Intrade prices that correctly predict election outcome
by weeks until election.
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Figure 12: Plot comparing the percentage of correct forecasts for our four dif-
ferent sources of forecast information for US elections.
best forecasting method to choose based on accuracy (percentage of forecasts
turning out correct) is Betfair from 30 weeks before an election up to election
week. In the three weeks immediately before an election the performance of the
four methods becomes much less dispersed, but nonetheless Betfair remains sig-
nificantly better than polls and Intrade, although not significantly better than
IEM WTA. With the exception of three weeks (8, 30 and 40 weeks prior), polls
are dominated by prediction markets in providing accurate forecasts in the 40
weeks before an election occurs. In the final 10 weeks before an election, the
performance of the IEM (both VS and WTA) and Intrade markets is indistin-
guishable statistically, and with the exception of forecasts 2 and 3 weeks before
an election, significantly superior to polls.
Thus, concluding our discussion of accuracy in terms of the percentage of
correct forecasts, we find that prediction markets dominate polls in providing
accurate forecasts.
vation per day per market for IEM, only a relatively small number of polls per market per
week, whereas we have often hundreds and even thousands of trades per day on Intrade and
Betfair. We do not reduce our Intrade or Betfair samples down to any kind of daily average
in order not to discard any important data.
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Figure 13: Plot comparing average forecast errors, as calculated in (4), head-
to-head between our forecast models, by weeks until election. Left panel is all
weeks in the year prior to an election, right panel focuses on final five weeks
pre-election.
5.2 Bias and Precision
We next consider bias, whether the expected value of a forecast equals the true
value, and precision, how much variance a forecast model exhibits, graphically
before conducting a basic regression analysis help quantify our findings.
Figure 13 plots the average errors with standard error bounds for all forecast
models hence giving an idea about the bias of forecasts. It is worth noting that
the standard error bounds contain information on the precision of each forecast
since the standard error of the forecast error is equal to the squared root of the
MSFE (from (8)) with the restriction αg = βg − 1 = 0 imposed. The left plot
shows the entire year before an election, while the right plot zooms in on the
final five weeks.
From the left panel what is perhaps most obvious is that over short intervals
all forecast models display biases in one direction or another, but over the longer
term these biases do appear to cancel each other out. The polls and IEM (both)
deliver what appears to be the most consistent performance, with Betfair and
Intrade fluctuating markedly around zero. In general polls have a slight upward
bias, while IEM has a slight downward bias, moreso in VS than WTA, Betfair
upward and Intrade downward. It thus appears that prediction markets provide
higher forecast success yet are not necessarily less biased than polls.
Considering the regression model approach outlined in Section 4, Table 1
contains the output from the regression models, while Figure 14 gives a graphical
representation, plotting the implied regression lines against a 45-degree line.
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) differ slightly from that of (3)–(5) in
that the first two columns are regressions of vote share outcomes (Vi,j,T ) on vote
share forecasts (V̂i,j,f,T |t ), while in the last three columns contain regressions
of actual outcomes of elections (Wi,j,T ) on implied probabilities (Ŵi,j,f,T |t ).
Nonetheless, the principle is the same in both regressions; unbiased forecasts
should be reflected in finding that αg = 0 and βg = 1, namely that the implied
regression line is on the 45 degree line and hence a poll forecasting a vote share
on average is correct (columns (1) and (2)), and a contract priced implying a
particular probability pays out with that frequency (columns (3)–(5)).
The first row of numbers in each column contains the estimates for αg, the
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Polls (V) IEM (V) IEM (W) Intrade (W) Betfair (W)
α̂g 0.109
∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗
(63.974) (62.113) (31.031) (-28.363) (-47.351)
β̂g 0.802
∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(181.418) (56.241) (105.674) (516.245) (460.119)
p val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F stat 2699.612 1943.101 482.209 409.130 2849.682
σ̂2g 0.008 0.042 0.139 0.102 0.113
T 18766 11429 31737 356620 183775
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1: Regressions for bias and precision for all four firms over all observations.
intercept coefficient, while the second row contains the estimates for βg, the
slope coefficient. Beneath these coefficients is the output of an F-test of αg = 0
and βg = 1; the first line is the p-value, the probability of a incorrect rejection of
the null hypothesis, and the second row is the F-test statistic itself. In essence,
the larger is the F-test statistic, the further away from α = 0 and β = 1 is that
particular set of forecasts. Because of the huge sample sizes of our regressions
(from the final row), it is expected that p-values will be very small.18 The
largest F-test statistics by some distance are for polls in the first column, and
Betfair in the fifth column. For polls this is mainly driven by a departure from
unity of the β̂g coefficient, at 0.802, and the constant coefficient at 0.109, while
for Betfair it would appear more a function of sample size since the deviation
from αg = βg − 1 = 0 is smaller yet the sample size is ten times as large
as for polls. In terms of actual coefficient sizes, the smallest departure from
αg = βg − 1 = 0 is for Intrade. Both IEM markets show significant departures
also from αg = βg − 1 = 0, with VS dramatically so.
In terms of precision, it is notable that the two vote share regressions have
a much smaller σ̂g than the winner-takes-all regressions; within the vote share
models, polls display much more precision than IEM, and within the winner
takes all Betfair and Intrade are more precise than IEM, with Intrade appear-
ing most precise. It is here where a correspondence between vote shares and
probabilities (WTA) would be most helpful; however as mentioned earlier, to
do so requires a number of untestable assumptions to be made regarding the
shape of the distribution of vote shares Yt. Nonetheless a crude comparison we
could use here to compare would be to make use of the ratio of σ̂gs for IEM,
which is 0.30157, suggesting that polls are more precise than prediction markets
in making forecasts.
Finally we note that polls and IEM (both VS and WTA) display evidence of a
reverse favourite-longshot bias (FLB), whereas Betfair and Intrade exhibit FLB.
The traditional favourite-longshot bias is the observed phenomenon, found in
numerous studies dispersed in time and across the world, that ‘longshots’ (out-
18(Campos, Hendry and Krolzig, 2003) discuss this problem with inference in large samples,
and suggest adjusting significance level to T−0.8, where T is sample size.
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Figure 14: Plot of implied slope for each forecast against 45-degree line.
comes quoted at high odds) tend to win less often than implied in the odds
while ‘favourites’ (outcomes quoted at low odds) tend to win relatively more of-
ten than implied in the odds (e.g. Sung and Johnson (e.g. 2010); Snowberg and
Wolfers (e.g. 2010). This may help explain the difference in accuracy noted
in Figure 12, where Betfair and Intrade appear to dominate the other three
forecast models. If favourites win more often than their forecast suggests, as
with Betfair and Intrade, then the percentage of forecasts that turn out correct
must be higher, and vice versa with polls and IEM.
Thus our regression models from Table 1 lend support to the conclusions
drawn from Figure 13: over the longer horizon all forecast models appear to
exhibit quite substantial bias, with the exception of Intrade, while prediction
markets appear to provide the least precise forecasts.
These results are plotted graphically in Figure 14; we plot each implied
regression line against the 45-degree line, as the 45-degree line signifies unbi-
asedness in each forecasting method. The thick black line is the 45-degree line,
and hence the degree of anticipated bias in each of our forecast models can be
read off Figure 14. We can read off, for whatever forecast a model provides
(horizontal axis), the expected actual outcome. We could make use of these
lines to de-bias our forecast models as Rothschild, and Erikson and Wlezien
do, since departures from the 45-degree line in Figure 14 reveal the extent of
bias in our forecast models. Rothschild uses a recursively estimation version of
Figure 14 based on previous elections to de-bias his 2008 election data.
The red line for polls crosses for vote shares in the mid-50s, suggesting that
in general the outturn will be less conclusive than polls suggest. The bias
in polls appears to be to over-predict the vote share for favorites, and under-
predict it for outsiders in a political race; reverse FLB. The IEM lines are
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Polls (V) IEM (V) IEM (W) Intrade (W) Betfair (W)
α̂g 0.013
∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(6.495) (4.926) (5.530) (-3.418) (-23.634)
β̂g 1.008
∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗
(191.199) (8.413) (28.222) (200.593) (290.260)
p val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F stat 186.279 12.618 16.328 12.015 584.645
σ̂2g 0.002 0.128 0.111 0.127 0.082
T 3007 360 1110 43295 41882
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Regressions for bias and precision for all four firms for observations
within one week of an election.
purple and both deviate quite substantially from the 45-degree line and in the
same direction as polls — the reverse FLB already noted. Intrade and Betfair
both display steeper slopes than the 45-degree line, such that for larger implied
probabilities, contracts priced at these levels pay out more often than they ought
to. Betfair’s slope is steepest out of the two.
Thus to a large extent, this plot helps explain the patterns observed for
the accuracy of these models in Figure 12; those models exhibiting FLB are
able to pick the favorite accurately, and since the favorite wins with a higher
probability, so these models forecast more accurately. Conversely, those models
exhibiting reverse FLB are unable to pick the favorite accurately, and by the
same reasoning these models must forecast less accurately.
As with accuracy, we can refine somewhat our analysis of bias and precision
by looking at forecasts made at various points before an election. Tables 2–4
show the same regressions as Table 1 but for forecasts made within the final
week of an election (Table 2), forecasts made between 2 and 10 weeks before
and election (Table 3), and forecasts made between 11 and 40 weeks before an
election (Table 2).
From Table 2 polls display much less bias in the final week than in the overall
regressions in Table 1, and Intrade still displays little bias also. IEM markets
still display appear biased (reverse FLB) while Betfair still displays FLB.
As we move to longer horizons in Tables 3 and 4, we observe that both
Intrade and Betfair display a more pronounced bias, IEM WTA display less
evidence of bias over this slightly longer time interval, polls slightly more bias
and IEM VS behavior is essentially unchanged from the final week. Polls also
depart further from unbiasedness as the time horizon increases; although at 2–
10 weeks the α and β coefficients are close to reflecting an unbiased forecast,
by 11–40 weeks they have departed significantly. The prediction markets also
display a markedly stronger bias (FLB) and lower precision over these longer
periods also. Again referring back to Figure 12, we note that over weeks 2–40,
Intrade and Betfair, the two models exhibiting strongest FLB, forecast most
accurately.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Polls (V) IEM (V) IEM (W) Intrade (W) Betfair (W)
α̂g 0.057
∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(24.079) (17.194) (11.412) (-32.560) (-63.753)
β̂g 0.930
∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 1.136∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗
(157.873) (21.271) (74.193) (218.537) (282.062)
p val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F stat 699.494 149.530 70.016 533.289 3602.357
σ̂2g 0.005 0.136 0.121 0.150 0.076
T 6269 3218 9597 82135 35054
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3: Regressions for bias and precision for all four firms over observations
within 2 and 10 weeks of an election.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Polls (V) IEM (V) IEM (W) Intrade (W) Betfair (W)
α̂g 0.149
∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(47.760) (23.438) (24.190) (-46.585) (-44.505)
β̂g 0.721
∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗
(87.155) (26.797) (73.972) (281.890) (296.885)
p val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F stat 1418.768 274.713 292.717 2007.052 2509.161
σ̂2g 0.011 0.140 0.141 0.079 0.113
T 6608.000 6485.000 17317.000 67949.000 81133.000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4: Regressions for bias and precision for all four firms over observations
within 11 and 40 weeks of an election.
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The information presented here suggests that firstly in terms of correct fore-
casts, prediction markets dominate polls. Consideration of bias and precision
shows that all forecast models are shown to be biased in different directions and
magnitudes at different times, while levels of precision also vary with polls being
the most precise and IEM the least. Nonetheless, it seems evident that models
exhibiting FLB are thus more able to identify favorites and hence forecast more
accurately.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated a number of information sources that might
be used to form a forecast of an election outcome. We consider the forecasts of
opinion polls and three different commonly used prediction markets. We assess
these forecast models in terms of accuracy, bias and precision, noting that an
accurate forecast can be biased and also imprecise, whilst an unbiased forecast
can be inaccurate. We make use of very large datasets recording the forecast
performance of these different models over a large number of elections since
2000 in the US. Our analysis suggests that prediction markets tend to provide
more accurate forecasts, although poll forecasts appear more precise, and in the
final weeks before an election are fairly unbiased. In particular commercial
prediction markets display distinct favorite longshot bias, suggesting that they
are more able to identify favorites that subsequently win the election, which
helps explain why these models forecast more accurately.
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Election Start Finish Freq. Percent
Congress 2000 28jan1999 08nov2000 2,592 5.69
Congress 2002 19jul2002 07nov2002 448 0.98
Congress 2004 17jun2004 05nov2004 568 1.25
Congress 2006 01jun2006 12nov2006 664 1.46
Congress 2008 22aug2008 07nov2008 312 0.68
Congress 2010 24nov2009 04nov2010 1,344 2.95
Senate Elections 2004 17jun2004 05nov2004 426 0.93
Senate Elections 2006 01jun2006 10nov2006 492 1.08
Senate Elections 2008 22aug2008 07nov2008 234 0.51
Senate Elections 2010 24nov2009 04nov2010 1,003 2.20
Florida Senate Election 2010 (vote share) 04jun2010 30nov2010 720 1.58
Florida Senate Election (winners takes all) 04jun2010 30nov2010 720 1.58
Minnesota Senate Election 2008 (vote share) 20aug2008 08nov2008 243 0.53
Minnesota Senate Election 2008 (winners takes all) 20aug2008 08nov2008 243 0.53
New York Senate Election 2000 14jun1999 08nov2000 2,725 5.98
House Elections 04 17jun2004 05nov2004 426 0.93
House Elections 06 01jun2006 10nov2006 492 1.08
House Elections 08 22aug2008 07nov2008 234 0.51
House Elections 10 24nov2009 04nov2010 1,004 2.20
Presidential Election 2000 (vote share) 03jan2000 05nov2000 920 2.02
Presidential Election 2000 (winners takes all) 24apr2000 10nov2000 597 1.31
Presidential Election 2008 (vote share) 01jun2006 07nov2008 1,830 4.01
Presidential Election 2008 (winners takes all) 01jun2006 07nov2008 1,830 4.01
Presidential Election 2004 (vote share) 20feb2003 31jul2004 7,026 15.41
Presidential Election 2004 (winners takes all) 26may2004 05nov2004 426 0.93
Democratic Convention 2000 14jun1999 17aug2000 3,219 7.06
Democratic Convention 2004 20feb2003 30jul2004 3,419 7.50
Democratic Convention 2008 24feb2007 28aug2008 2,300 5.04
Republican Convention 2000 14jun1999 03aug2000 2,339 5.13
Republican Convention 2008 24feb2007 10sep2008 3,141 6.89
Reform Convention 2000 03jan2000 12aug2000 1,105 2.42
Iowa Republican Caucus 12 29aug2011 05jan2012 889 1.95
New York City Mayoral Election 2001 03oct2001 09nov2001 108 0.24
Philadelphia Mayoral Election 2007 (vote share) 02apr2007 02jul2007 534 1.17
Philadelphia Mayoral Election 2007 (winners takes all) 02apr2007 02jul2007 529 1.16
Mexican Presidential Election 2000 (vote share) 01may2000 02jul2000 244 0.54
Mexican Presidential Election 2000 (winner takes all) 01may2000 02jul2000 244 0.54
Total 45,590
Table 6: Summary of data publicly available from Iowa Electronic Markets on
polling for US elections.
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Type Market Observations Type Market Observations
Presidential
Election
2004 44,462
Republican
Candidacy
Republican Candidate 19,505
2008 11,831 California Primary 566
Democratic
Candidacy
Democratic Candidate 39,012 Florida Primary 1,774
Alabama Primary 123 Iowa Caucus 501
Alaska Caucus 2 Michigan Primary 527
Arizona Primary 132 Nevada Caucus 357
Arkansas Primary 4 New Hampshire Primary 545
California Primary 1,564 New Jersey Primary 28
Colorado Caucus 7 South Carolina Primary 633
Connecticut Primary 78 New York Primary 26
Delaware Primary 13 Total 24,462
Georgia Primary 63
Next
President
Additional Runners 885
Idaho Caucus 4 Joe Biden 1,750
Illinois Primary 60 Michael Bloomberg 1,497
Indiana Primary 1,860 Mike Huckabee 965
Iowa Caucus 941 Mitt Romney 1,224
Kansas Caucus 6 Ron Paul 1,009
Kentucky Primary 88 Rudy Giuliani 977
Massachusetts Primary 227 Sarah Palin 901
Minnesota Caucus 13 Al Gore 3,151
Missouri Primary 184 Barack Obama 33,105
Nevada Caucus 516 Hillary Clinton 10,405
New Hampshire Primary 1,710 John Edwards 454
New Jersey Primary 250 John McCain 27,484
New Mexico Caucus 19 Total 83,807
New York Primary 249
Elections
2008
Arkansas 120
North Carolina Primary 551 Indiana 3,103
North Dakota Caucus 2 New Mexico 154
Ohio Primary 1,041 North Dakota 317
Oklahoma Primary 19 Nevada 211
Oregon Primary 148 Colorado 224
Pennsylvania Primary 1,265 Florida 1,593
Tennessee Primary 55 Georgia 622
Texas Primary 2,305 Kentucky 170
Utah Primary 17 Missouri 1,337
Washington Caucus 69 Montana 376
West Virginia Primary 110 Nebraska 41
Wisconsin Primary 460 Ohio 840
Total 53,167 North Carolina 1,117
Pennsylania 310
Total 10,535
Grand Total 228,264
Table 7: Data from Betfair on US Elections
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Market Obs. Market Obs. Market Obs.
Presidential Election - Main Presidential Election - Other House of Representatives
Winner (Indiv.) 334,286 Bob Barr - Elec. Coll. Votes 14 2008 House Control 368
Winner (Party) 18,007 Bob Barr - Popular Vote 444 Dem. Seats in House 548
Rep. Elec. College Votes 1,225 Dropouts, April 172 Dist. 12 Penn 2
Electoral College Tie 90 Dropouts, Dec. 210 Dist. 6 Minn 2
Alabama 38 Dropouts, Feb 519 Total 920
Alaska 209 Dropouts, Jan 349 Senate
Arizona 784 Dropouts, Jun 72 2008 Senate Control 501
Arkansas 248 Dropouts, Jul 1,291 Dem. Seats in Senate 1,444
California 293 Dropouts, May 186 Alabama 4,919
Colorado 926 Dropouts, Mar 568 Alaska 393
Connecticut 109 LA Times Obama PLO video 3 Colorado 29
Delaware 29 Ralph Nader - Popular Vote 117 Georgia 599
Florida 2,535 Joe Biden to be withdrawn 548 Idaho 22
New Jersey 405 Sarah Palin to be withdrawn 2,599 Kansas 6
Nevada 877 Michael Bloomberg Independent 1,073 Kentucky 75
Nebraska 63 Ron Paul Independent 249 Louisiana 64
Montana 1,270 Who benefit most from 1st debate 330 Maine 22
Missouri 2,803 Who benefit most from VP debate 606 Massachusetts 2
Mississippi 111 Who will run for President? 941 Minnesota 2,092
Michigan 487 Date of 1st Debate 215 Nebraska 29
Minnesota 576 Election Postponed? 48 New Hampshire 179
Maryland 52 Obama Touch Mkt 9 New Jersey 27
Georgia 1,605 McCain Touch Mkt 39 New Mexico 64
Hawaii 17 X: Obama Options. F 123 Mississippi (Class I) 81
Idaho 16 X: Obama Options. M 15 Mississippi (Class II) 5
Illinois 57 X: Obama Options. T 1 North Carolina 170
Indiana 3,956 X: Obama Options. W 83 Oklahoma 8
Iowa 558 X: Obama Options. W 147 Oregon 184
Kansas 142 X: Obama Options. W 54 South Carolina 2
Kentucky 93 X: Obama Options. W 75 South Dakota 14
Louisiana 194 X: Obama Options. W 98 Texas 65
Maine 152 X: Obama Options. W 82 Virginia 69
Massachusetts 26 X: McCain Options. Fr 132 West Virginia 1
North Carolina 3,212 X: McCain Options. Mo 1 Wyoming (Class I) 3
North Dakota 1,023 X: McCain Options. We 21 Total 11989
Ohio 1,846 X: McCain Options. We 17 Governor Elections
Oklahoma 37 X: McCain Options. We 7 Delaware 2
Oregon 247 X: McCain Options. We 19 Kentucky 1
Pennsylvania 1,404 X: McCain Options. We 12 Louisiana 1
New Hampshire 796 X: McCain Options. We 34 Missouri 8
New Mexico 586 Total 11523 North Carolina 13
New York 118 Other Utah 2
Rhode Island 30 Immigration Reform Act 20 24 Vermont 1
South Dakota 120 London Mayoral Election 2008 94 Washington 12
South Carolina 187 Massachusetts Question 1 8 Total 40
Tennessee 141 Media Endorsements 20 Party Convention
Texas 125 New York City Mayoral Term Limits 18 Brokered Conventions 579
Utah 24 Next Prime Minister of New Zealand 6 Clinton Lifeline 524
Vermont 61 Next UK Chancellor 15 Hillary Clinton on Dem. ticket 64
Virginia 2,237 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Dec 3 119 MI/FL hold new Primary? 426
Washington 128 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Jun 3 38 Most Superdelegates? 423
West Virginia 863 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Mar 3 29 Total 2016
Wisconsin 395 Pres. Job Appr. Rating. Sep 3 72
Wyoming 22 Fairness Doctrine 6
Total 385,841 Total 449
Total 411,858
Table 8: Summary of data from Intrade for 2008 elections.
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